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Abstract
This paper shows that implementation cycles, introduced in Shleifer (1986) , are possible
in the presence of capital and the absence of borrowing constraints. In a two-sector economy,
patents on cost-saving ideas which take the form of investment-specific technological change ar-
rive exogenously at a sequential, perfectly smooth rate: in odd-numbered periods, they reach a
firm producing capital of type 1 and, in the even-numbered ones, a firm producing capital of type
2 . Firms can make profits out of these once. While the immediate appropriation (henceforth,
“implementation”) of patents is always a possibility, for accordingly formed expectations, firms
can alternatively implement their patents simultaneously. This is because investment-specific
technological change naturally introduces a one-period discrepancy between the time firms im-
plement their patents and the time they receive revenue out of them. The implementation of
a patent implies a sharp fall in investment which, in turn, causes a boom in current consump-
tion. As a result, the consumption boom takes place before the wealth boom. This not only
eliminates the need to smooth consumption away from the wealth boom to the period before it
as conjectured, but, further, it implies that the interest rate paid when revenue is realized -and
wealth expands- falls. Consequently, present discounted profits rise and implementation cycles
can become a possibility. In a policy extension, I show that prolonging patent rights to two
periods rules out “implementation cycles” and may lead to a welfare improvement.
JEL Classification: D42, D51, E21, E22, E32, O33, O34.
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1 Introduction
When it comes to the release of new products, companies, especially technology ones, are particularly
concerned about two things: its timing and being secretive. The latter suggests that potential gains
are short-lived; the former suggests that timing affects them.
This paper attempts to address three questions, related to the above remarks. First, can com-
panies coordinate the launch of new (improved) products even though they may develop them
time-separately in the presence of capital (or any storable commodity) and the absence of borrow-
ing constraints? Second, can regulators affect this possibility by extending rights over improved
technologies? And if so, will this necessarily lead to welfare improvements? Yes, yes, and perhaps.
A natural starting point in this attempt is Shleifer (1986) which introduced “implementation
cycles.” However, it did so in an economy where storable commodities are absent and argued that
their absence is indeed indispensable.1 This paper builds on it, allows for capital and savings and
shows that, in sharp contrast with Shleifer’s conjecture, implementation cycles are still possible.
More analytically, the economy consists of a representative agent who consumes a final good
produced by a respective firm which he owns and to which he supplies his labor. The final-good
firm is competitive and, besides labor, uses two different types of capital. For each type of capital,
there is a respective sector comprising a number of Bertrand-competing capital makers. Capital
makers use foregone consumption (investment) to produce the capital good they specialize in.
Suppose that in odd-numbered periods, a patent reaches randomly a firm (capital maker) in
sector 1 and, in the even-numbered ones, a firm in sector 2 . Patents are on cost-reducing technologies
which imply that a unit of capital requires less resources in order to be produced. Initially, as in
Shleifer (1986) , I let firms make profits out of a patent only for one period; once a patent is utilized,
the innovating firms’ competitors costlessly copy the idea the patent was on and drive sector profits
to zero -until a new patent arrives to the sector. As competitors cannot reverse-engineer an idea
a patent is on before it is actually implemented, I will henceforth use the terms patent and idea
interchangeably.
Firms need to decide when they will implement their patents. I show that, if they share expec-
tations about future and have perfect foresight, multiple “sunspot” equilibria can arise: firms can
either implement their patents as soon as they receive them, which implies that patents are in place
at the same -perfectly smooth- rate as that of their arrival, or they may instead coordinate their
1See (Shleifer, 1986, page 1183) .
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implementation, in which case “implementation cycles” with capital are generated.
To see this, note that imperfect competition invites demand externalities among capital-good
sectors. Since a capital maker can postpone implementation of a patent, for instance, to the following
period, when with certainty no improved technology will arrive, it needs to decide whether to
implement it immediately or in the following period. As Matsuyama (1995) notes, it is precisely the
intertemporal decision that firms face in combination with the presence of intratemporal demand
externalities that can result in multiple equilibria which can be Pareto-ranked.
Nevertheless, and despite this intuition, implementation cycles in the presence of capital and the
absence of borrowing constraints (or constrained investment volatility) is something that Shleifer
(1986) conjectured against: anticipating future profits, agents would attempt to reduce their current
savings in order to smooth out consumption. In turn, that would lower production and hence profits
in a hypothetical implementation boom. For consumption smoothing to be mitigated, higher real
interest rates would be necessary, which would in turn imply that firms discount future profits more.
Both effects could rule out implementation cycles.
Why is this not so here? The reason is that patents are on investment-specific technological
change, in the spirit of Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) . Investment-specific technological change
introduces a one-period discrepancy between the consumption boom and the wealth boom. To see
this, note that the implementation of a patent in the technology of a capital good reduces its current
production cost, whereas the revenue out of it becomes realized in the following period. The latter
implies that the wealth boom occurs one period after the coordinated implementation of patents
takes place. The former implies that investment is substantially reduced in the implementation
periods -in fact, it can even undershoot- and drives consumption above trend. As a result, the
interest rate paid then is higher than the interest rate paid in the following, “wealth-boom,” period.
This increases investment in implementation booms, smoothing out consumption in the opposite
direction from the conjectured one -without overturning the result on consumption which is a general
equilibrium one-, and implies that more capital is installed in the following period which, given the
elastic demand for it, leads to greater profits. Taking all into account, discounted profits after a
conjectured coordinated implementation of patents become greater and, therefore, implementation
cycles with capital possible.
In a policy extension, I let firms appropriate a patent for two periods. It turns out that imple-
mentation cycles become impossible. To see this, note that, in that case, postponing implementation
to the following period is equivalent to postponing implementation to two periods afterwards in the
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one-period monopoly case. In a stationary equilibrium, every other period is the same. As a re-
sult, as long as firms discount future at a positive rate, which turns out to be always the case, the
possibility of implementation cycles is ruled out.
A natural question is whether the immediate implementation of patents when patent rights last
two periods is welfare-improving over the equilibria when patent rights last one period. Relative
to the immediate implementation equilibrium of the latter case the answer is negative: patents
diffuse faster to the implementing firms’ competitors which implies that the economy reaches a
certain consumption level faster. Nevertheless, relative to the cyclical equilibrium the answer can
be positive. There are two effects which push in opposite directions. The first one is the one already
described: patents (only of sector 2 though) diffuse faster in the cyclical equilibrium. Nevertheless,
in the “two-period patent” equilibrium, two firms appropriate a patent in each period. In other
words, two firms cut down on current investment every period as opposed to -them doing so- every
other period in the cyclical “one-period patent” equilibrium. This effect favors consumption in
the two-period patent equilibrium. For patents being on not too drastic (cost-reducing) ideas, the
foregone cost of them being diffused faster does not exceed the consumption benefit of having two
sectors implementing in each period, rendering, thereby, a prolongation of patent rights potentially
desirable.
Related literature. The closest paper to the present one is Shleifer (1986) , the main differences
with which I highlighted above. In the remaining parts of the paper, I frequently refer to how the
two papers relate to each other in greater detail.2,3
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) also generates implementation cycles with capital which, further,
can be sustained as a unique equilibrium outcome. Although, their model is quite different from the
one in this paper, I will restrict attention to two key differences. A central assumption the authors
make is that patents arrive after firms have incurred an endogenous search cost. A consequence
of this assumption is that patents arrive simultaneously in all sectors, which is in sharp contrast
with the perfectly smooth rate of their arrival in Shleifer (1986) and here: if patents arrive in
cycles, they are more easily implemented in cycles as well. A second key difference is that, in
2A simplified version of Shleifer (1986) which could serve as an intermediate step between Shleifer’s model and mine
can be found on Lawrence Christiano’s teaching webpage. The link to this is http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.
edu/~lchrist/d11/d1101/implement.pdf .
3With expectations arbitrarily supporting one of the possible multiple equilibria, this paper relates to the
“sunspots” literature, which, includes, among other articles, Azariadis (1981) , Cass and Shell (1983) and Grand-
mont (1985) . Benhabib and Farmer (1999) offers an overview of this literature. A complementary earlier survey with
an emphasis on endogenous cycles can be found in Boldrin and Woodford (1990) .
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Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) , patents do not affect the technology of capital but they instead
affect the technology of intermediate goods which requires only labor. Consequently, the wealth and
the consumption booms coincide. Here, patents affect the investment technology which naturally
introduces a one-period discrepancy between the consumption and the wealth boom.4
Turning to the literature related to the paper’s result on patent policy, this paper differs from a
recent and growing literature on patent protection and intellectual property rights which includes,
among other articles, Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2008b) and Henry and Ponce (2011) .5,6 This liter-
ature focuses on the incentives to innovate and analyzes whether markets for patents can substitute
for the absence of patent rights. Here, innovation is exogenous, whereas allowing for a market for
patents would leave the results intact.
Hopenhayn and Squintani (2010) also considers the effects of patent rights on the timing of patent
releases. However it does so in a model of sequential innovation which allows for preemptive entry
by an innovating firm’s competitors. Consequently, the timing of patents balances the possibility
of preemption and the generation of future patents. I abstract from such considerations here: firms
can utilize a patent immediately or with delay without the fear of preemption and without the
fear that the implementation of a patent affects their future generation of patents, which happens
independently over time, randomly and costlessly.
These abstractions allow the paper to concentrate solely on the effects of patent rights on the
implementation -rather than the generation- of patents and, thereby, offer a clean argument from a
different -and, to the best of my knowledge, new- perspective to the ongoing -and lively- discussion
about the length of patent rights.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes
the equilibria when patent rights last one period. Section 4 discusses welfare. Section 5 extends
patent rights to two periods and performs welfare comparisons with the equilibria which can prevail
when patent rights last one period. Section 6 concludes.
4Certainly this paper shares features, which I will not attempt to review here, with the growth literature, prominent
contributions to which include Romer (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) , the
literature on strategic delay (for instance, Chamley and Gale (1994)) , as well as Matsuyama (1999) and, more recently,
Jovanovic (2009) . Needless to say, this list is by no means exhaustive.
5See also the discussion in Boldrin and Levine (2008a) .
6This literature dates back to Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) . Chapter 12 in Acemoglu (2009) offers
an excellent overview of the early literature. Holmes and Schmitz (2010) offers a more general discussion on how
competition affects productivity.
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2 The Model
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived (representative) agent. The agent consumes a single
storable commodity (final good) produced by a (representative) final-good firm to which he supplies
labor. Further, the final-good firm uses two storable (composite) capital goods in an additively-
separable way. For each capital good, there is a respective sector which comprises at least two
capital-good firms Bertrand-competing for its production. It takes one period to produce a capital
good and foregone consumption (investment) is used as input in its production. Capital-good firms
become the recipients of patents on cost-saving ideas (henceforth, simply “patents”) and, once
they implement these, they can make temporary monopoly profits before being imitated by their
competitors. I elaborate more on this last -and central- feature of the economy below.
There is no uncertainty; agents and firms share expectations about the future and have perfect
foresight. Agents (firms) can perfectly borrow against their future profits (revenue) . Time is
discrete and infinite and commences in period 1 .
2.1 Representative agent
The preferences of the agent are given by
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 U(xt , lt) (1)
with
U(xt , lt) = log xt + χ log lt , (2)
where xt denotes consumption of the final good, lt denotes leisure, β ∈ (0, 1) parametrizes the
agent’s time preference, and χ > 0 parametrizes the relative weight on leisure within the period
utility of the agent.7
The agent is endowed with one unit of time, owns all firms in the economy and can freely borrow
against his perfectly foreseen future profits. This last assumption is essentially an assumption of
perfect capital markets and allows me to use the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint given by
∞∑
t=1
mt xt ≤
∞∑
t=1
mt [wt (1 − lt) + Πft +
2∑
i=1
Πt,i ] , (3)
7The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1 . However, the implementation cycles that I specify below are
more easily generated the greater the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is.
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where mt =
1
R1 ... Rt−1 for t > 1 , with m1 = 1 ; Rt denotes the gross real interest rate paid in
period t+1 , wt denotes the real wage paid by the final-good firm, and Π
f
t and Πt,i denote the profits
that accrue to the agent by the final-good firm and capital-good firm i for i = 1, 2 , respectively.
All prices and the real interest rate are expressed in units of the final good.
The agent chooses {(xt , lt)∞t=1} , where xt > 0 and lt ∈ (0, 1] to maximize his lifetime utility
given by (1) - (2) subject to his intertemporal budget constraint given by (3) . The first order
conditions with respect to xt and lt imply the following relations:
xt+1
xt
= β Rt (4)
xt+1
xt−1
= β2RtRt−1 (5)
lt+1
lt
= β Rt
wt
wt+1
(6)
lt+1
lt−1
= β2RtRt−1
wt−1
wt+1
. (7)
2.2 Final-good firm
The final-good firm is competitive in both the final-good and the input markets. Its (neoclassical)
technology is given by
F (nt , kt,1 , kt,2) = n
α
t (k
1−α
t,1 + k
1−α
t,2 ) , (8)
where nt denotes employed labor, kt,1 and kt,2 denote capital of types 1 and 2, respectively, rented
8
in period t and α ∈ (0, 1) measures the labor share and the inverse elasticity of substitution between
the two types of capital.9 Note that the marginal products of the two capital types are conditionally
-on labor- independent of each other as in Romer (1990) . I assume that capital depreciates fully
8I assume that final-good firms rent rather than buy capital in order to avoid possible problems with the final-good
firm buying capital in advance in order to use it in the future.
9The technology of the final-good firm can be alternatively expressed as F (nt,Kt) = n
α
t K
1−α
t , where Kt ≡
(k
α−1
α
t,1 + k
α−1
α
t,2 )
α
α−1 with α =
1
α
.
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within a period.10
In each period t , the final-good firm chooses {nt , kt,1 , kt,2 , yt} (all in non-negative quantities)
to maximize its temporal profits given by
Πft = yt − wt nt − qt,1 kt,1 − qt,2 kt,2 ,
where yt ≤ F (nt , kt,1 , kt,2) with F (·) given by (8) ; qt,i denotes the real rental price of capital
type i for i = 1 , 2 . In period 1 , the firm is endowed with quantities of capital k1,1 and k1,2 , on
which I elaborate below and in Section 4.1 .
The firm’s maximization problem yields
wt = αn
α−1
t (k
1−α
t,1 + k
1−α
t,2 ) (9)
qt,i = (1− α)nαt k−αt,i , for i = 1 , 2 . (10)
Observe that both demand functions are elastic (w,n = − 11−α and q,ki = − 1α , respectively) and
that profits are zero in each period, an implication of constant returns to scale.
2.3 Capital-good firms
I consider two types of capital goods.11 For each capital good, there is a number of capital makers
which Bertrand-compete for its production with no capacity constraints. They are indexed by j and
j′ for firms 1 and 2, respectively, where j = 1 , 2 , . . . , J and j′ = 1 , 2 , . . . , J ′ with J , J ′ ≥ 2 .
Capital-good firms operate a constant-returns-to-scale technology. For instance, the technology
of capital maker j manufacturing capital of type 1 is given by
kt,1,j = ψt−1,1,j it−1,1,j , (11)
10 Since capital depreciates fully within a period and with demand for it being positive in equilibrium, it may be
pointed out that this is essentially an irreversibility constraint since it effectively rules out disinvestment. That may
be true at face value, nevertheless, at the same time, it implies that investment has the highest possible volatility as
each period the economy needs new capital to be produced. See also fn. 33 .
11This is an abstraction. In fact, I need two baskets of capital goods with each basket including a sufficiently high
number of capital goods so that each capital-good firm is small enough within its “basket.” The desired implication of
this assumption is that capital-good firms take aggregate outcomes as given; put differently, any strategic interactions
among firms within and across baskets are ruled out. For simplicity, let each basket contain a continuum of unit
measure of capital goods. That is kt,i =
∫
i′ ∈ [0,1] kt,i,i′ di
′ , where kt,i,i′ denotes capital good i
′ in basket i in
t . Assuming a symmetric treatment of capital goods within a composite capital good allows me henceforth, for
expositional clarity, to mention capital-good type i and actually refer to the representative capital good (i, i′) in
basket i .
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where kt,1,j denotes capital of type 1 produced by capital maker j in period t and it−1,1,j denotes
capital maker j’s investment, which is foregone consumption, in period t − 1 used as input in the
production of capital type 1 . Likewise for capital good of type 2 (see also fn. 10) .
Aggregate investment in t is
it =
J∑
j=1
it,1,j +
J ′∑
j′=1
it,2,j′ . (12)
Supposing that, before the economy starts, firms j and j′ in sectors 1 and 2 , respectively, have
no inferior technology relative to that of their competitors, the initial level of investment required
is given by
i0 =
k1,1,j
ψ0,1,−j
+
k1,2,j′
ψ0,2,−j′
, (13)
where ψ0,1,−j and ψ0,2,−j′ denote the technology level of their competitors before the economy starts.
Since I focus on the balanced growth path (steady state) of the economy, I treat time as if had
commenced in −∞ . This implies that capital in period 1 summarizes the state of an economy
which started in −∞ . Equivalently, an economy which starts in period 1 must do so with the
“right” levels of capital. I resume this discussion in Section 4.1 .
2.3.1 Pattern of patents
I make two assumptions on the arrival of patents which are as in Shleifer (1986) .
Assumption 1. Patents on improved technologies arrive exogenously. They reach sectors sequen-
tially, at a perfectly smooth rate. With no loss of generality, a patent reaches randomly a firm in
capital sector 1 in odd periods and a firm in capital sector 2 in the even ones. Patents are on ideas
that affect the technology of capital of type i in the following way:
ψt+1,i,j
ψt−1,i,j′′
= µ ,
where µ > 1 and ψ·, i, j denotes the state-of-the-art technology (inverse marginal cost of capital) in
sector i possessed by firm j .12 As time commences in period 1 , an odd period, imposing ψ0,1,j = 1
and ψ0,2,j′ = µ
1
2 removes the first-mover advantage of sector 1, thereby ensuring the symmetric
treatment of capital-good sectors: the lead in the technology race alternates between sectors with
12Observe that the economy encompasses only investment-specific technological change as in Greenwood et al.
(1997) . For expositional reasons, I completely abstract from total factor productivity (TFP) .
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their relative technology “distance” remaining fixed at µ
1
2 . Put differently, it is as if time commenced
in −∞ .13
Assumption 2. A firm can appropriate an idea a patent is on only for one period: in the period
following its implementation, this idea becomes publicly disclosed and imitators enter driving prices
down to marginal cost and profits to zero.14
2.3.2 Profits
Profits of capital maker j 15 which produces capital good i are given by
Πt,i,j = qt,i,j kt,i,j − Rt−1 it−1,i,j .
Capital maker j of capital good i chooses {kt,i,j , it−1,i,j} for each t to maximize its profits subject
to the technology given by (11) . Since revenue is realized one period after investment is made, I
allow capital-good firms to be able to perfectly borrow against their future revenue.
Below I distinguish between two cases: in the first case, all firms within sector i operate the
same technology in which case a firm, say j , is randomly selected to produce capital of type i . In
the second case, firm j has a technological advantage over its competitors which allows it to enjoy
monopoly profits.
Perfect competition. When ψt,i,j = ψt,i,−j , where ψ·,·,−j denotes the inverse marginal cost of
the competitors of capital maker j , there is perfect competition which, given the constant returns
to scale, implies zero profits.
Firm j in sector i supplies the capital good i at price
q∗t,i,j =
Rt−1
ψt−1,i,−j
. (14)
13Although I have not explored this case, presumably the assumption that patents arrive periodically could be
partially relaxed; what really matters is that the probability with which a patent reaches a particular sector before
the indicated time is sufficiently low. The fact that patents reach the economy at a perfectly smooth rate renders the
generation of cycles harder and crystallizes the forces which underpin them. If patents arrived in a cyclical fashion,
then their cyclical implementation would perhaps come as no surprise. In fact, this is what underpins the result in
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) , in which, though, the timing of the patent arrival is endogenous.
14The fact that firms make temporary monopoly profits is an assumption in line with Shleifer (1986) as well as the
Schumpeterian growth literature originating in Aghion and Howitt (1992) , which also focuses on quality improvements
(“process innovations”) ; it is in contrast with Romer (1990) in which firms’ rights over the use of an idea last forever.
Further, unlike the endogenous growth literature, this paper entirely abstracts from issues concerning the generation
of patents. This will prove useful in Section 5 where I extend the horizon of patent rights to two periods, as it will
enable me to focus on the “implementation” effects of patent rights and to entirely abstract from their effect on the
generation of patents, an issue which the literature traditionally studies.
15With a slight abuse of notation, henceforth I will make no distinction between j and j′ .
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Inverse demand for capital from the final-good firm (10) pins down the competitive quantity given
by
k∗t,i,j =
(
(1− α)ψt−1,i,−j
Rt−1
) 1
α
nt . (15)
Monopoly in the presence of a competitive fringe. Capital maker j implementing a patent in
the production of capital type i , for instance, in period t−1 enjoys monopoly profits in the following
period, t , as it takes one period to build capital. Capital maker j chooses kt,i,j to maximize its
profits given by
Πt,i,j = qt,i,j kt,i,j − Rt−1 kt,i,j
µψt−1,i,−j
, (16)
subject to the (inverse) demand for capital given by (10) . Since demand for capital is elastic, the
solution is well defined:
qmt,i,j =
Rt−1
(1− α)µψt−1,i,−j and k
m
t,i,j =
(
(1− α)2 µψt−1,i,−j
Rt−1
) 1
α
nt .
Henceforth, I restrict attention to the case in which qmt,i,j ≥ q∗t,i,j . In this case, the “limit”
price q∗t,i,j is set: a capital maker which implements a patent cannot charge more than the price its
competitors would set, q∗t,i,j , else its competitors would undercut it and capture the whole market.
Limit pricing takes place (i.e. qmt,i,j ≥ q∗t,i,j ) when
µ (1− α) ≤ 1 . (17)
The lower the innovation rate, µ , and the less elastic the demand for capital is, the more easily (17)
is satisfied. For a certain level of the elasticity of the demand for capital, condition (17) imposes an
upper bound on the innovation rate. Likewise, for a certain innovation rate, (17) imposes an upper
bound on the elasticity of capital demand.16
Then, a monopolist sells a quantity given by (15) , which corresponds to the technology level of
its competitors, at the price its competitors would set, given by (14) , and makes profits because of
its lower -by µ relative to its competitors- marginal cost of producing a unit of capital. Combining
(16) with (14) and (15) implies that the monopolist’s profits are given by
16For α = 2/3 , this implies that µ ≤ 3 . In R&D theory, the complementary case in which qmt,i,j < q∗t,i,j refers to
“drastic innovations.” See also Chapter 12 in Acemoglu (2009) .
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Πt,i,j = (1− α) 1α ψ
1
α
−1
t−1,i,−j
(
µ− 1
µ
)
nt
R
1
α
−1
t−1
. (18)
Profits depend negatively on the interest rate paid in the period they are made. This is because
demand for capital is elastic and a higher real interest rate implies that capital becomes more
costly. That the demand for capital is elastic also explains the increase of profits in the technology
level of a monopolist’s competitors. In addition, profits depend proportionally on contemporaneous
employment by virtue of the technology of the final-good firm.
2.3.3 The implementation decision
As I have already argued, the implementation of a patent results in profits in the following period.
In the presence of two capital-good sectors, suppose that the recipient of a patent needs to decide
whether to implement it immediately or in the following period.
A capital maker j in sector i receiving a patent in, say, period t−1 will implement it immediately
rather than in the following period as long as its present discounted period t profits exceed its present
discounted t+1 profits. That is (superscripts denote the date a patent arrives and time in subscripts
refers to the date profits are made) , it must be that
Πt−1t,i,j
Rt−1
≥ Π
t−1
t+1,i,j
Rt−1Rt
.
By (18) , this boils down to
nt
nt+1
(
Rt
Rt−1
) 1
α
−1
≥ 1
Rt
. (19)
In the complementary case in which
nt
nt+1
(
Rt
Rt−1
) 1
α
−1
<
1
Rt
, (20)
capital maker j prefers to postpone implementation to the following period.
Implicit in these is that a capital maker cannot affect the real interest rate by its actions alone
(see also fn. 11) .
Last, note that, even though profits depend on the competitors’ technology level at the period
of implementation, the implementation decision is independent of it.
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3 Balanced Growth Path Equilibria
I restrict attention to perfect-foresight, balanced growth path equilibria at which the period of cycles
is constant.
On the balanced growth path (BGP) , consumption, production, and investment grow all at the
same long-run rate. However, since, by construction, a patent reaches a sector every other period,
the growth rate of the economy’s variables may differ between odd and even periods within a cycle.
I impose the following stationarity conditions on consumption:
xτ+1
xτ
= v (21)
xτ+1
xτ−1
= λ , (22)
where τ denote an even period, with no loss of generality (see also fn. 19) . Combining (21) and
(22) with (4) and (5) implies
Rt =
 vβ if t = τλ
v β if t = τ + 1
. (23)
Combining (22) with (5) leads to the following remark:
Remark 1. Rτ Rτ+1 =
λ
β2
.
Next, I provide the equilibrium definition:
Definition 1 (BGP Equilibrium). A perfect-foresight (periodic) balanced growth path equilibrium
is a set of interest rates {Rt}∞t=1 and prices {wt , {qt,i}2i=1}∞t=1 , an allocation {lt, xt}∞t=1 for the
representative agent, an allocation {nt , {kdt,i}2i=1 , yt}∞t=1 for the final-good firm, and an allocation
({kst,i , it,i}∞t=1)i=1,2 for the technology-leading firms in the capital-good sectors,17 such that
1. (Stationarity) Stationarity (steady-state) conditions (21) and (22) are satisfied.
2. (Optimality) The allocations of the agent, the final-good firm and the leaders in the capital-good
sectors solve their problems, laid out in Section 2 , at the stated prices.
3. (Market clearing) kdt,i = k
s
t,i ≡ kt,i for all i , nt + lt = 1 and yt = xt + it where it =
it,1 + it,2 , for all t .
17kt,i refers to capital produced by sector i . Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, if all firms within a sector
have the same technology level, a capital-good firm is randomly chosen.
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4. (Consistency) For expectations arbitrarily centered around an equilibrium (“sunspots”) , capital-
good firms must find it optimal to implement their patents as conjectured.
5. (No storage) No storage takes place.
I start with the no-storage condition (requirement (5) in Definition 1) :18
Condition 1 (No storage). Rt > 1 for all t rules out storage in equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As my focus is on stationary equilibria, I will restrict attention to just period τ , an even period,
and the periods before and after it. Hence, following the analysis in Section 2.3.1 , in period τ − 1,
an odd period, a patent reaches a firm in sector 1 and the state-of-the-art technology, irrespectively
of whether the patent is implemented or not, becomes µψ , greater by by µ compared to its assumed
previous level ψ , whereas in sector 2 it remains µ1/2 ψ ; in period τ a patent reaches a firm in sector
2 in which the state-of-the-art technology becomes µ3/2 ψ , whereas in sector 1 it remains µψ . As
I have already pointed out, the ratio of leading technologies in the two sectors equals µ1/2 in odd
periods and 1
µ1/2
in even ones; that is, the lead of the patent race alternates between sectors ad
infinitum.
I analyze two perfect-foresight equilibria: an acyclical, immediate implementation equilibrium
and a cyclical, synchronized implementation one. In the former, capital makers implement a patent
as soon as they receive it. In the latter, the capital maker receiving a patent first (henceforth, “firm
1”) waits and implements it together with the capital maker receiving a patent second (henceforth,
“firm 2”) ; that is patents are implemented in even periods.19
For each equilibrium, I first center expectations around it and ensure that requirements (1) - (3)
in Definition 1 are satisfied. Next, I specify the conditions under which the conjectured timing of
the patents’ implementation is optimal for the capital-good firms (requirement (4) in Definition 1) .
Last, I confirm that the no-storage condition is met and pin down the transversality condition.
18The storage technology I assume is one-to-one.
19Although I have not explored this possibility explicitly, I find no reason for why there cannot be a symmetric
equilibrium in which patents are implemented in odd periods, which, in fact, could well be the case under the premise
that period 1 summarizes the state of an economy starting in −∞ . This would require simply letting τ denote an
odd period. Since time however starts in an odd period, welfare in the two cyclical equilibria will be different. See
my conjecture on that in fn. 42 .
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3.1 Immediate implementation equilibrium
In the immediate (acyclical) implementation equilibrium, firms expect each other to implement
their patents immediately.
Period τ−1 . Firm 1 receives a patent which it immediately implements. Since I assume through-
out that condition (17) holds, firm 1 sets the same price as its competitors would, given by (14) ,
and produce the quantity which the technology level of their competitors justifies, given by (15) .
In line with the analysis above, the technology levels in the two sectors are ψτ−1,1,−j = ψτ−2,1 =
ψ < ψτ−1,1,j = µψ , since µ > 1 , and ψτ−1,2 = µ
1
2 ψ , respectively.20 Then,
kτ,1 =
(
(1− α)ψ
Rτ−1
) 1
α
(1− lτ ) (24)
kτ,2 =
(
(1− α)µ 12 ψ
Rτ−1
) 1
α
(1− lτ ) . (25)
Investment by (11) and (12) is
iτ−1 =
kτ,1
µψ
+
kτ,2
µ
1
2 ψ
. (26)
Combined with (24) and (25) , (26) becomes
iτ−1 =
[
µ−1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− lτ )
R
1
α
τ−1
. (27)
Observe that investment depends negatively on the interest rate paid in the following period, whereas
it is proportionally related to the following period’s employment, an implication of the constant-
returns-to-scale technology of the final good.
Similarly, since ψτ−2,1,−j = ψ and ψτ−2,2,−j = µ−
1
2 ψ ,
kτ−1,1 =
(
(1− α)ψ
Rτ−2
) 1
α
(1− lτ−1) (28)
kτ−1,2 =
(
(1− α)µ− 12 ψ
Rτ−2
) 1
α
(1− lτ−1) . (29)
20Whenever I omit j or − j from the technology subscript, I refers to all firms within a sector.
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Combining (8) with (28) and (29) yields
yτ−1 =
[
1 + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α−1 (1− lτ−1)
R
1
α
−1
τ−2
. (30)
Output depends negatively on the interest rate paid currently: the higher the current interest rate
the lower the investment in capital and, thus, the lower current production is.
Market clearing in the final-good market implies that consumption is given by
xτ−1 = ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α

(
1 + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
)
(1− lτ−1)
(1− α)R
1
α
−1
τ−2
−
(
µ−1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
)
(1− lτ )
R
1
α
τ−1
 . (31)
Period τ . Firm 2 receives and immediately implements a patent. In period τ , technology in the
two sectors is ψτ,1, = µψ and ψτ,2,−j = µ
1
2 ψ < ψτ,2,j = µ
3
2 ψ . Capital in the following period is
given by
kτ+1,1 =
(
(1− α)µψ
Rτ
) 1
α
(1− lτ+1) (32)
kτ+1,2 =
(
(1− α)µ 12 ψ
Rτ
) 1
α
(1− lτ+1) . (33)
By (11) and (12) , investment is
iτ =
kτ+1,1
µψ
+
kτ+1,2
µ
3
2 ψ
,
which combined with (32) and (33) becomes
iτ =
[
µ
1
α
−1 + µ
1
2α
− 3
2
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− lτ+1)
R
1
α
τ
. (34)
Substituting (24) and (25) in (8) yields
yτ =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α−1 (1− lτ )
R
1
α
−1
τ−1
.
Market clearing in the final-good market implies that consumption is
xτ = ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α

(
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
)
(1− lτ )
(1− α)R
1
α
−1
τ−1
−
(
µ
1
α
−1 + µ
1
2α
− 3
2
)
(1− lτ+1)
R
1
α
τ
 . (35)
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Period τ + 1 . Firm 1 receives and implements a patent. Technology in the two sectors is
ψτ+1,1,−j = µψ < ψτ+1,1,j = µ2 ψ and ψτ+1,2 = µ
3
2 ψ . Then,
kτ+2,1 =
(
(1− α)µψ
Rτ+1
) 1
α
(1− lτ+1) (36)
kτ+2,2 =
(
(1− α)µ 32 ψ
Rτ+1
) 1
α
(1− lτ+2) . (37)
Proceeding in the same way as before, investment is given by
iτ+1 =
kτ+2,1
µ2 ψ
+
kτ+2,2
µ
3
2 ψ
,
which combined with (36) and (37) becomes
iτ+1 =
[
µ
1
α
−2 + µ
3
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− lτ+2)
R
1
α
τ+1
.
Substituting (32) and (33) into (8) yields
yτ+1 =
[
µ
1
α
−1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α−1 (1− lτ+1)
R
1
α
−1
τ
.
Market clearing in the final-good market implies that consumption is
xτ+1 = ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α

(
µ
1
α
−1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
)
(1− lτ+1)
(1− α)R
1
α
−1
τ
−
(
µ
1
α
−2 + µ
3
2
( 1
α
−1)
)
(1− lτ+2)
R
1
α
τ+1
 . (38)
The above satisfy optimality and market clearing, that is requirements (2) - (3) of the equilibrium
definition. Next, I impose stationarity and check for consistency and no storage in turn.
For accordingly formed expectations, an immediate implementation (acyclical) equilibrium is
sustained as long as each firm which receives a patent finds it optimal to implement it immediately.
I split this into two steps, as in Shleifer (1986) , which I label “Profit Condition 1 (IPC1)” and
“Profit Condition 2 (IPC2) .”
Profit condition 1 . In the acyclical equilibrium the economy grows at a constant rate. By
symmetry, employment and the real interest rate remain constant across periods, that is lτ =
lτ+1 ≡ l and Rτ−1 = Rτ ≡ R (see also fn. 21) .
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A firm prefers to implement a patent immediately rather than in the following period if and
only if condition (19) is satisfied. Given that employment and the real interest rate are constant,
condition (19) simplifies to
R ≥ 1 . (IPC1)
Profit condition 2 . I look for the condition under which no firm receiving a patent has an
incentive to wait for two periods irrespectively of the fact that a new patent will arrive in its sector
rendering the one in question obsolete. That is interest rates must be such that no firm has an
incentive to wait “too much.” It must be then that
Πt−1t,i
Rt−1
≥ Π
t−1
t+2,i
Rt−1RtRt+1
.
Since Rt−1 = Rt ≡ R , the above condition boils down once again to
R ≥ 1 . (IPC2)
Profit condition 2 ensures that firm 1 does not postpone implementation to the next odd period
and firm 2 to the next even one.
Combining profit conditions (IPC1) and (IPC2) implies that no firm postpones implementation
to any period after the next odd (for firm 1) or even (for firm 2) one either. To see this, note that
profit condition (IPC2) implies that, for instance, firm 1 does not wait until the next odd period,
whereas by profit condition (IPC1) , it does not wait until the even period following this, and so
forth, and likewise for firm 2 .
3.1.1 Balanced growth path
As I have already noted, by symmetry, lodd = leven ≡ l and Rτ−1 = Rτ ≡ R .21 Then, it follows
from (23) that v = λ
1
2 and from (22) , (31) and (38) together that λ = µ
1
α
−1 . Then, by (23) , the
real interest rate along the balanced growth path is R = µ
1
2 (
1
α−1)
β . Since µ > 1 , α ∈ (0 , 1) and
β ∈ (0 , 1) , it follows that R > 1 , which satisfies profit conditions (IPC1) and (IPC2) as well as
the no-storage condition (Condition 1) .22
21One can confirm that this is in fact a unique stationary solution by taking the same steps as in the synchronized
implementation equilibrium. The steps in the case of the synchronized implementation equilibrium are collected in
the Appendix.
22 Since R > 1 , the transversality condition, which I show for the synchronized implementation equilibrium in the
Appendix, always holds.
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These lead to the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Steady-growth). An acyclical (steady-growth) equilibrium is always possible for ac-
cordingly formed expectations.
Further, the endogenous variables evolve as follows on the balanced growth path:23
yt+1
yt
=
it+1
it
=
xt+1
xt
= µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) , for all t (39)
l =
[
α
χ
µ (1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1))
µ − β(1− α) + (1− β(1− α))µ1+ 12 ( 1α−1)
+ 1
]−1
. (40)
That is, in the acyclical (baseline) equilibrium, output, consumption, and investment grow at the
same constant rate, whereas employment remains constant across time.
A higher innovation rate, µ , sets the economy onto a steeper growth path and results in a
higher real interest rate, while a lower subjective discount factor β also calls for a higher interest
rate. Turning to leisure, it increases in µ and the relative taste parameter for leisure χ and decreases
in β .
3.2 Synchronized implementation equilibrium
I focus on the synchronized (cyclical) implementation equilibrium at which, firm 1, which receives
a patent in an odd period, finds it optimal to save it and implement it in the following even period
together with firm 2 which receives a patent then (see also fn. 19) .
Period τ − 1 . A patent reaches firm 1 and is not implemented but is instead stored and imple-
mented in τ . Effectively, from the viewpoint of τ − 1 , a not implemented patent is as if it had
never arrived. As (17) holds, firm 1 (likewise, firm 2) sets the same price and produces the same
quantity as its competitors would, given by (14) and (15) , respectively, and it produces at the same
marginal cost as they would. The technology with which the following period’s capital is produced
is ψτ−1,1,−j = ψ and ψτ−1,2 = µ
1
2 ψ . Then, capital in the following period is given by
23To find leisure, I use the intratemporal optimality condition χ xt
lt
= wt , where, from the final-good firm’s problem,
wt = α
yt
1−lt .
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kτ,1 =
(
(1− α)ψ
Rτ−1
) 1
α
(1− lτ ) (41)
kτ,2 =
(
(1− α)µ 12 ψ
Rτ−1
) 1
α
(1− lτ ). (42)
Since
iτ−1 =
kτ,1
ψ
+
kτ,2
µ
1
2 ψ
, (43)
investment in period τ − 1 is
iτ−1 =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− lτ )
R
1
α
τ−1
. (44)
Likewise, as the technology of firm j’s competitors in τ − 2 is given by ψt−2,1,−j = µ−1 ψ and
ψt−2,2,−j = µ−
1
2 ψ , capital in τ − 1 is given by
kτ−1,1 =
(
(1− α)µ−1 ψ
Rτ−2
) 1
α
(1− lτ−1) (45)
kτ−1,2 =
(
(1− α)µ− 12 ψ
Rτ−2
) 1
α
(1− lτ−1) . (46)
The above imply
yτ−1 =
[
µ− (
1
α
−1) + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α−1 (1− lτ−1)
R
1
α
−1
τ−2
. (47)
Market clearing in the final-good market implies that consumption in τ − 1 is
xτ−1 =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α
 1− lτ−1
µ
1
α
−1(1− α)R
1
α
−1
t−2
− 1− lτ
R
1
α
t−1
 . (48)
Period τ . Implementation takes place in both sectors. Technology across capital makers in the
two sectors is ψτ,1,−j = ψ < ψτ,1,j = µψ and ψτ,2,−j = µ
1
2 ψ < ψτ,2,j = µ
3
2 ψ , which implies
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that in period τ + 1 capital is
kτ+1,1 =
(
(1− α)ψ
Rτ
) 1
α
(1− lτ+1) (49)
kτ+1,2 =
(
(1− α)µ 12 ψ
Rτ
) 1
α
(1− lτ+1) . (50)
Since
iτ =
kτ+1,1
µψ
+
kτ+1,2
µ
3
2 ψ
,
investment in period τ is
iτ =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
µ
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− lτ+1)
R
1
α
t
. (51)
The production function (8) combined with (41) and (42) yields
yτ =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1(1− α) 1α−1 (1− lτ )
R
1
α
−1
t−1
. (52)
Market clearing in the final-good market then implies that
xτ =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α
 1− lτ
(1− α)R
1
α
−1
τ−1
− 1− lτ+1
µR
1
α
τ
 . (53)
Period τ + 1 . A patent reaches firm 1 but it is kept stored until period τ + 2 , when the next
implementation boom takes place. Since it is not implemented, effectively it is as if it had never
arrived. Effective technology in the two sectors is ψτ+1,1,−j = µψ and ψτ+1,2 = µ
3
2 ψ , which
implies that capital in τ + 2 is
kτ+2,1 =
(
(1− α)µψ
Rτ+1
) 1
α
(1− lτ+2)
kτ+2,2 =
(
(1− α)µ 32 ψ
Rτ+1
) 1
α
(1− lτ+2) .
Taking familiar steps, since
iτ+1 =
kτ+2,1
µψ
+
kτ+2,2
µ
3
2 ψ
,
investment in period τ + 1 is given by
iτ+1 = µ
1
α
−1
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− lτ+2)
R
1
α
τ+1
. (54)
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Combining the production function (8) with (49) and (50) implies
yτ+1 =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α−1 (1− lτ+1)
R
1
α
−1
τ
. (55)
Market clearing then implies
xτ+1 =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α
 1− lτ+1
(1− α)R
1
α
−1
τ
− µ
1
α
−1 (1− lτ+2)
R
1
α
τ+1
 . (56)
A two-period implementation cycle -of the type that I focus on- requires firm 1 , which receives
a patent in an odd period to find it optimal to wait exactly one period before implementing it,
and firm 2, which receives a patent in the following even period to find it optimal to implement it
immediately. I will take the same steps as in the case of the acyclical equilibrium. Starting with
consistency and after imposing stationarity, I first derive the condition under which firm 1 prefers to
postpone implementation to the following period rather than implement immediately, which I label
“Profit Condition 1 (SPC1) ;” subsequently, I explore the condition under which firm 1 prefers not
to postpone implementation from the following implementation boom to the one after that, which I
label “Profit Condition 2 (SPC2) .” The two conditions combined imply that firm 1 prefers to wait
exactly one period to implement and firm 2 prefers to implement immediately than in any future
period. Omitted derivations in what follows are collected in the Appendix.
Profit condition 1 . Firm 1 prefers to implement in the following period rather than immediately
as long as its present discounted profits in the former case exceed its present discounted period in
the latter (recall profits are realized one period after implementation) . Of course, expectations are
centered around the synchronized implementation equilibrium in both cases.24 Given stationarity
and τ being an even period, the implementation decision, made in τ − 1 , must then satisfy
Πτ−1τ+1,1
Rτ−1Rτ
>
Πτ−1τ,1
Rτ−1
. (SPC1)
Given (18) , (SPC1) becomes
1− lτ+1
1− lτ >
R
1
α
τ
R
1
α
−1
τ−1
, (57)
24For the lack of strategic interactions among firms see fn. 11 .
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which as I show in the Appendix boils down to
µ [1 + β (1− α)]
µ + β (1− α) >
1
β
. (58)
We can see that (58) is more easily satisfied as µ and β increase and as α decreases. A higher
innovation rate implies higher profits, hence a greater incentive for firms to coordinate in the
presence of demand externalities. A higher β implies that firm 1 is more likely to wait for a certain
level of profits; in the limit as β → 1 , (58) is always satisfied. Turning to α , it parametrizes both
the capital share (1 − α) as well as the elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital
( 1α) . Greater values of both imply that implementation cycles are more easily sustained. As α falls,
the former increases whereas the latter increases. However, the former effect dominates, hence (58)
is more easily met. Last, observe that (58) is independent of the relative weight of leisure χ in
the agent’s preferences which is due to the separability of leisure and consumption within the flow
utility and, given this, to preferences being logarithmic in consumption.25
Profit condition 2 . For a synchronized implementation (cyclical) equilibrium to be sustained,
no firm must find it optimal to postpone implementation past the two-period cycle. For this to be
the case, it suffices to show that no firm has an incentive to wait until the next implementation
period, i.e. period τ + 2 , an argument also appearing in Shleifer (1986) .
To see this in the case of firm 1 , note that, given the stationary structure of the economy, if
firm 1 prefers to implement in τ rather than in τ − 1 , i.e. when condition (SPC1) holds, then it
also finds it optimal to postpone implementation from τ + 1 to τ + 2 . In other words, condition
(SPC1) effectively implies that implementation can only take place in even periods. Thus, showing
that firm 1 opts to implement in τ as opposed to doing so in τ +2 or, by the same token, any future
even period, is what I need to complete the consistency requirement of Definition 1 . Note that this
argument is independent of the fact that a new patent will reach sector 1 in τ + 1 rendering the
patent received in τ − 1 obsolete. An analogous reasoning applies to firm 2 .
Then, in the case of firm 1 , the following condition must be satisfied:
Πτ−1τ+1,1
Rτ−1Rτ
≥ Π
τ−1
τ+3,1
Rτ−1Rτ Rτ+1Rτ+2
. (SPC2)
Given that Rτ−1 = Rτ+1 and Rτ = Rτ+2 , condition (SPC2) simplifies to
Rτ Rτ+1 ≥ 1 . (59)
25For α = 2/3 , which by (17) requires µ ≤ 3 , χ = 1.5 and β = 0.97 , (58) requires approximately that µ > 1.14 .
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Condition (SPC2) implies that profits are discounted at an on average positive net real interest rate
and we can think of it as a weak version of the transversality condition which I analyze below.
One can confirm that conditions (57) and (59) combined imply that firm 2 finds it optimal to
implement immediately.26
Combining (22) and (23) with (48) and (56) implies that
λ = µ
1
α
−1 > 1 , since µ > 1 . (60)
Lemma 1. Remark 1 and (60) imply that (59) always holds.
3.2.1 Balanced growth path
Leisure. On the balanced growth path of the synchronized implementation equilibrium, leisure
takes values which alternate between odd and even periods and remain constant every other period,
that is lτ−1 = lτ+1 = lodd and lτ = lτ+2 = leven .27 As I show in the Appendix, leisure is given by
lodd =
[
α
χ
µ (1 + β (1− α))
µ − β2(1− α)2 + 1
]−1
(61)
leven =
[
α
χ
µ + β (1− α)
µ − β2(1− α)2 + 1
]−1
. (62)
Remark 2. It is lodd < leven .
Remark 2 implies that employment falls when implementation takes place.
Interest rates. Equilibrium interest rates are given by (23) , with λ given by (60) and v given by
26 Starting with profit condition 2, it would be like (SPC2) but without Rτ−1 in the denominators, which plays no
role anyway. Then, (59) is what we need.
Turning to profit condition 1 , firm 2 implements immediately if
Πττ+1,i
Rτ
≥ Π
τ
τ+2,i
Rτ Rτ+1
.
After substituting for profits, given by (18) , and exploiting stationarity, which implies lτ = lτ+2 , the above condition
boils down to
Rτ+1
(
Rτ+1
Rτ
) 1
α
−1
≥ 1− lτ
1− lτ+1 .
This holds if conditions (57) and (59) hold together which we can confirm by multiplying the LHS of (57) by Rτ Rτ+1 .
27I use interchangeably throughout lτ−1 , lτ+1 and lodd for leisure in odd periods and lτ , lτ+2 and leven for leisure
in the even ones.
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v =
[
µ(
1
α
−1)2 α (µ + β (1− α)) + χ (µ− β2 (1− α)2)
αµ (1 + β (1− α)) + χ (µ− β2 (1− α)2)
] α
2−α
. (63)
Claim 1. It is v < µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
It follows from (60) that the geometric average growth rate is µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) , which is the one that
prevails every period in the immediate implementation (steady-growth) equilibrium. Controlling
for deviations from it and using Claim 1 implies that consumption booms when implementation
takes place.
Letting Reven and Rodd denote the real interest rate paid in odd and even periods in the syn-
chronized equilibrium, respectively,28 and, with R denoting the real interest rate in the immediate
implementation equilibrium, Claim 1 leads to the following remark:
Remark 3. It is Reven < R < Rodd .
Controlling for variations in employment, Remark 3 bears witness to the presence of demand
externalities between the two capital-good sectors: since Reven < R , profits (both discounted
and current-valued) of the following firm (firm 2) , which implements a patent immediately in both
equilibria, are greater in the synchronized than in the immediate implementation one (see also (18)) .
Allowing for variations in employment does not overturn this observation for all the parametrizations
that I have considered.
Transversality condition. In what is the last step, I check the transversality condition. The
transversality condition requires the present discounted value of the agent’s lifetime wealth to con-
verge. In other words, the present discounted value of the labor income and the capital-good
firms’ profits needs to converge. In the Appendix I show that the transversality condition is always
satisfied.29
With (SPC2) always satisfied, the following proposition can be generated:
Proposition 1. A two-period synchronized implementation equilibrium prevails as a perfect-foresight
equilibrium as long as condition (SPC1) and the no-storage condition (1) are satisfied.
28Throughout I use interchangeably Reven , Rτ and Rτ+2 for the interest rate paid in odd periods and Rodd , Rτ−1
and Rτ+1 for the interest rate paid in the even ones.
29This result is due to preferences being logarithmic in consumption. For general CRRA preferences, the transver-
sality condition is more easily satisfied the lower the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is.
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This proposition is central to the paper. In sharp contrast with the conjecture in (Shleifer,
1986, page 1183) , implementation cycles with capital can be generated and they do so for plausible
values of the parameters. Importantly, this happens in the presence of storable commodities and in
the absence of borrowing constraints and investment irreversibilities (on the latter see also fn. 33 ).
But how so? Following Shleifer’s line of thought, one would expect that, in the prospect of future
profits, agents would reduce current savings and, thereby, future capital stock in order to smooth
out their consumption across periods. At the same time, a (real) interest rate increase would be
necessary to prevent agents from borrowing in the period before the wealth expansion. Both effects
combined imply that firms’ present discounted profits in an implementation boom would fall which
could eliminate their incentives to postpone implementation until then.
This intuition does not apply here. This is because, in sharp contrast with Shleifer (1986) in
which innovations are sector-neutral, that is they enhance total factor productivity (TFP), innova-
tions here are investment-specific as in Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) . This difference in modeling
technological change is important. Unlike changes in TFP, investment-specific technological change
introduces a one-period discrepancy between the date firms invest and the date they receive their
revenue. As a result, a coordinated implementation of patents implies a concurrent considerable
fall in savings/investment -in fact, investment can even undershoot- due to the reduced cost of
producing capital and a considerable increase in the wealth of agents in the period following it.30
The former implies that consumption grows considerably in an implementation boom even after
taking into account the effects on output.31 The latter implies that the consumption boom takes
place before the wealth boom. This not only eliminates the need to smooth consumption away
from the wealth boom to the period before it, but, additionally, it implies that the interest rate
linking the implementation period to the one when revenue is realized and wealth expands actually
falls (Remark 3) . As a result, firms discount future profits less rather than more. The fall in the
real interest rate, in turn, causes two, tied to each other, effects. First, it increases investment in
an implementation period which thereby smooths out consumption in the opposite direction from
the conjectured one, though (without overturning results; Claim 1 is a general equilibrium result) .
Second, it leads to an increase of the capital stock in the period revenue is realized relative to that
30In fact, output and, consequently, labor income also boosts with a one-period lag (see the analysis below) . This
need not be always true. For instance, in the extreme case in which labor is inelastically supplied, labor income
booms when implementation takes place. Nevertheless, for all the parametrizations that I have considered, variations
in labor income prove insufficient to make the wealth boom happen simultaneously with the consumption boom and,
hence, potentially overturn the intuition in the main text.
31More precisely, consumption grows above trend as Claim 1 attests.
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in the implementation period.32 With the demand for capital being elastic, this implies that the
profits capital-good firms make following an implementation boom grow rather than fall (see also
(18)) relative to the profits they would have made had they implemented alone. Taking everything
into account, present discounted profits increase which eventually makes implementation cycles pos-
sible (Proposition 1) .33
Below I discuss the role of parameters in the generation of cycles and the balanced growth path.
I set α = 23 , which by (17) implies that µ ≤ 3 and, based on Greenwood et al. (2000) , χ = 1.5
and consider values of β close to 1 .34 A consequence of setting α = 23 is that v , given by (63) , is
greater than one. In turn, this implies that Rτ is greater than one, whereas by Claim 1 , Rτ+1 is
also greater than one. As a result, the no-storage condition is always satisfied.
Generation of cycles. A greater innovation rate sets the economy onto a steeper growth path
which is accompanied with higher interest rates, Rτ and Rτ+1 . However, Rτ+1 increases sufficiently
more than the interest rate paid after an implementation boom, Rτ , does so that the RHS of
(57) falls. In other words, controlling for changes in employment which as I argue next actually
reinforce this effect, as the innovation rate increases, discounted profits in an implementation boom
become greater relative to profits that would be realized if firm 1 instead opted to implement alone.
This is because a greater innovation rate results in considerably reduced savings/investment in an
implementation period. In turn, this implies a substantial increase in contemporaneous consumption
both in absolute and, crucially, in relative to trend terms, where I define as trend the geometric
average growth rate λ
1
2 = µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) which characterizes the immediate implementation (steady-
growth) equilibrium.35
Turning to leisure/employment, a greater innovation rate, µ , results in an increase in leisure in
both periods; the leisure ratio lτ+1lτ falls, whereas the employment ratio
1−lτ+1
1−lτ , which is on the LHS
32Simply compare equations (41) - (42) with (49) - (50) . The result follows from Remarks 2 and 3 .
33As I noted in fn. 10 , that capital depreciates fully effectively rules out disinvestment and, therefore, it could
be argued that I impose investment irreversibilities which according to (Shleifer, 1986, page 1183) could render
implementation cycles possible. The way I interpret his argument, even though such an interpretation may be
susceptible to criticism, is that he expects that too volatile investment would rule implementation cycles with capital
out. By allowing for full capital depreciation, I indeed maximize the volatility of investment as new capital needs to
be produced every period. In fact, as it may have already become apparent, it is the excessive investment volatility
-actually investment can even undershoot- that renders implementation cycles with capital possible here.
34The numerical values that I report below correspond to β = 0.97 , which is again based on Greenwood et al.
(2000) . In fact, many results below hold for a much wider range of parametrizations, however I abstract from such
considerations.
35The trend of output, consumption and investment is µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) , that of capital is µ
1
2α and that of employment is
1 .
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of (57) increases. Taking both effects into account, the greater the innovation rate µ , the more
attractive an implementation boom is to firm 1 .
A greater β lowers v , that is consumption in the implementation periods becomes higher both
in absolute and relative to trend terms, and both interest rates. This is because agents become
more patient. However, Rτ+1 falls less relative to Rτ and the RHS of (57) decreases. Parallel to
this, a greater discount factor β decreases leisure in all periods as well as the leisure ratio lτ+1lτ ,
whereas it increases the employment ratio 1−lτ+11−lτ , which is on the LHS of (57) . Once again both
effects imply that a higher β leads more easily to implementation cycles.
Next, I analyze the balanced growth path.
Balanced growth path. Output, consumption and investment grow by µ
1
α
−1 every two periods:
yt+1
yt−1
=
xt+1
xt−1
=
it+1
it−1
= µ
1
α
−1 . (64)
Within a cycle, we know that xτ+1xτ = v , whereas output and investment’s evolution is given by
yτ+1
yτ
=
(
1− lτ+1
1− lτ
) (
Rτ+1
Rτ
) 1
α
−1
iτ+1
iτ
=
(
1− lτ
1− lτ+1
) (
µRτ
Rτ+1
) 1
α
,
which follow from (52) and (55) , and (51) and (54) , respectively.
After substituting for the interest rates, given by (23) , and using eq. (96) in the Appendix, the
above expressions become
yτ+1
yτ
= v
(
µ (1 + β(1− α))
µ+ β(1− α)
)
(65)
iτ+1
iτ
= v
(
µ+ β(1− α)
1 + β(1− α)
)
, (66)
where v is given by (63) .
For the considered parametrization, output grows above trend in the period following the im-
plementation of patents. Investment is procyclical and undershoots: it falls when implementation
takes place, as fewer resources need to be directed towards the production of capital goods, and
rises sharply in the period following implementation. Further, by Remark 2 employment is pro-
cyclical, whereas, most notably, by Claim 1 consumption is countercyclical. As I argued above, it
is necessary for the generation of cycles that consumption booms in the implementation periods.
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The above and (65) and (66) imply that investment is more volatile than output since iτ+1iτ >
yτ+1
yτ
. In turn, output is more volatile than employment. Notably (for the considered parametriza-
tion), consumption is also more volatile than output36 but less volatile than investment. The
interpretation for this is simple: with output relatively stable, a very volatile investment implies a
very volatile consumption.
As the innovation rate increases, investment, consumption and employment become more volatile,
whereas the volatility of output responds non-monotonically increasing at low values of µ and falling
at higher ones.37
4 Welfare
From a planner’s viewpoint, both equilibria are suboptimal which is due to the (periodic) presence
of monopolies in the capital-good markets.38 Nevertheless, the equilibria can be Pareto ranked.
In the immediate implementation equilibrium, the lifetime utility of the representative agent,
given by (1) - (2) , is equal to
Ui = log x
i
1 + χ log l + β
(
logµ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) xi1 + χ log l
)
+ β2
(
logµ
1
α
−1 xi1 + χ log l
)
+ . . . ,
where I have taken into account that leisure is constant across time and that consumption grows
each period by µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) (see (39) - (40)) . This expression boils down to
Ui =
1
1− β
(
1
2
β
1− β logµ
1
α
−1 + log xi1 + χ log l
)
, (67)
where l is given by (40) .
36As consumption is countercyclical, I compare
yτ+1
yτ
given by (65) with xτ
xτ−1 , where
xτ
xτ−1 =
µ
1
α
−1
v
.
37In addition to these, note that, for the considered parametrization, capital is countercyclical. To see this, recall
that, because of “limit-pricing,” implementing firms produce the quantity of capital that their competitors would
produce. This implies that, controlling for variations in interest rates and leisure, patents will affect the quantity of
capital installed after two periods. Further, capital is more volatile than output, which should not come as a surprise
given that it depreciates fully within a period, is less volatile than investment and its volatility increases in µ .
38Since the implementation of a patent improves the technology of an implementing firm’s competitors, one would
suggest that externalities is an additional source of inefficiency. My argument for why this is not indeed an issue is
the same as the one in Shleifer (1986) (in particular, see (Shleifer, 1986, page 1178) and fn. 10 there) . In principle,
this potential problem could be corrected by allowing for decentralized markets on a one-to-one basis between the
firm endowed with a patent and one of its competitors with the former setting the price in exchange for sharing the
rights to its patent (we can equivalently think in terms of contracts on an individual, “take it or leave it” basis) .
The presence of constant returns to scale in the capital-good’s technology implies that competitors, which behave
symmetrically, will demand zero at any positive price since, afterwards, they will Bertrand-compete at least with the
firm owning the patent which, in turn, is not willing to suggest a zero price. Hence, markets would clear at positive
prices small enough so that demand and supply are equal to zero in each period. Therefore, externalities is not an
additional source of inefficiency.
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In the synchronized implementation equilibrium, the lifetime utility of the agent is
Us = log x
s
1 + χ log lodd + β
(
log
µ
1
α
−1
v
xs1 + χ log leven
)
+ β2
(
logµ
1
α
−1 xs1 + χ log lodd
)
+ . . . ,
where I have taken into account that leisure is constant controlling for the period being odd or even
and that consumption grows as (21) and (22) prescribe. The above expression simplifies to
Us =
1
1− β
[
β
1− β2 logµ
1
α
−1 − β
1 + β
log v + log xs1 +
χ
1 + β
(log lodd + β log leven)
]
, (68)
where v is given by (63) and lodd , leven are given by (61) and (62) , respectively.
To make welfare comparisons, simply subtract (68) from (67) to get
Ui−Us = 1
1− β
[
β
1 + β
(
log v − logµ 12 ( 1α−1)
)
+ log xi1 − log xs1 + χ
(
log l − log lodd + β log leven
1 + β
)]
.
(69)
For the considered parametrization, welfare is greater in the immediate implementation equilib-
rium than in the synchronized implementation one.39 To analyze this result, I will start with the
last terms in (69) , which reflect differences in welfare due to differences in leisure levels. For the
considered values of α , χ and β and sufficiently high values of µ , the leisure component of lifetime
utility is greater in the synchronized implementation equilibrium. However, the effect of leisure in
welfare comparisons is typically negligible.
What is crucial is differences in lifetime consumption. To analyze these, I will draw a distinction
between the difference in the initial consumption levels, captured by the third and the fourth term
in (69) combined, and the difference in the consumption growth rates between the two equilibria,
captured by the first two terms. The latter takes a negative value by Claim 1 . To see this, recall
that the growth rate every two periods is the same across equilibria. Hence, the difference in
consumption growth is due to the difference in the growth rate within a cycle, captured by the first
two terms in (69) . Since consumption grows faster in the synchronized implementation equilibrium
(Claim 1) , the first two terms combined take a negative value.
Turning to the initial level of consumption, it is higher in the immediate implementation equi-
librium. To see this compare (31) and (48) .40 It turns out that in the immediate implementation
39In fact, I have failed to obtain the opposite result for a wide range of parametrizations.
40Since what matters is relative consumption, any odd-period consumption would do for the comparison between
equilibria.
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equilibrium output is greater and investment lower compared to the synchronized implementation
equilibrium.41 Controlling for the interest rates which do not overturn the result for the considered
parametrization, investment is lower in the immediate implementation equilibrium since one firm
(firm 1) implements a patent as opposed to none doing so in the synchronized implementation one
(compare (26 with (43)) . As for output, once again controlling for the interest rates, it is greater
in the immediate implementation equilibrium because patents in sector 1 are implemented faster
which leads to a greater level of capital of type 1 (compare (28) with (45)) and, hence, a greater
level of output.42
4.1 Initial levels of capital/investment
Section 3 analyzed the two equilibria independently of each other. By this I mean that, in each
equilibrium, the economy starts with the “right” quantity of capital-goods.
Below, I find the initial (period-0) investment required in each equilibrium. I suppose that the
level of initial investment is the one that would have prevailed if time had started in −∞ . Therefore,
I set ψ = 1 and divide the RHS of both (34) and (51) by µ
1
α
−1 .43 This yields, respectively,
ii0 =
[
1 + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
+1)
]
(1− α) 1α 1− l
R
1
α
(70)
is0 =
[
µ−
1
α + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
+1)
]
(1− α) 1α 1− lτ+1
R
1
α
τ
, (71)
where l is given by (40) , R = µ
1
α−1
β , lτ+1 is given by (61) and Rτ =
v
β with v given by (63) .
For the considered parametrization,44 initial investment is greater in the immediate implementa-
tion equilibrium. As a result, the two cases can be Pareto ranked only conditional on this difference
in initial investment.
41The result for investment is true for the standard parametrization but not in all the ones that I have considered,
whereas the results for output and, crucially, consumption hold for all the parametrizations that I have considered.
42I have not explored welfare in the case of a synchronized implementation equilibrium in which implementation
booms take place in odd periods (see also fn. 19) . Nevertheless, since that cyclical equilibrium is symmetric with
the considered one and given that time commences in an odd period, my conjecture is that results would possibly be
overturned. Such an argument might apply to the welfare considerations in Section 5 as well.
43I opted for initial investment rather than initial levels of capital in order to facilitate comparisons between
equilibria. To find initial levels of capital one needs to set ψ = 1 in kτ−1,1 and kτ−1,2 .
44In particular, this is true for all the parametrizations that I have considered.
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5 The Desirability of Extending Patent Rights
In this section I explore whether extending the patent horizon is potentially welfare-improving.
Therefore, the only assumption that I relax concerns the duration of patent rights. In particular,
I let firms make monopoly profits out of a patent for two periods instead of one. Everything else
remains unchanged.
5.1 Immediate implementation equilibrium
As in Section 3.1 , leisure and the real interest rate remain constant across periods with values given
by l˜ and R , respectively, which I find subsequently.45
Period τ − 1 . Firm 1 receives a patent which it immediately implements, whereas firm 2 , which
implemented its patent in the previous period, enters its second and last period as a monopolist.
The technology levels in the two sectors are ψτ−1,1,−j = ψ < ψτ−1,1,j = µψ and ψτ−1,2,−j =
µ−
1
2 ψ < ψτ−1,2,j = µ
1
2 ψ , respectively. Then,
kτ,1 =
(
(1− α)ψ
R
) 1
α
(1− l˜) (72)
kτ,2 =
(
(1− α)µ− 12 ψ
R
) 1
α
(1− l˜) . (73)
Investment is given by
iτ−1 =
kτ,1
µψ
+
kτ,2
µ
1
2 ψ
.
Combining the above expression with (72) and (73) yields
iτ−1 =
[
µ−1 + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
+1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− l˜)
R
1
α
. (74)
Similarly, since ψτ−2,1,−j = µ− 1 ψ and ψτ−2,2,−j = µ−
1
2 ψ ,
45As it will become evident below, the real interest rate in an immediate implementation (steady-growth) equilibrium
is the same irrespectively of the duration of patent rights, hence the use of R as opposed to, for instance, R˜ .
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kτ−1,1 =
(
(1− α)µ−1 ψ
R
) 1
α
(1− l˜)
kτ−1,2 =
(
(1− α)µ− 12 ψ
R
) 1
α
(1− l˜) .
I proceed in a familiar way to find output and consumption:
yτ−1 =
[
µ− (
1
α
−1) + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α−1 (1− l˜)
R
1
α
−1 (75)
xτ−1 = ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− l˜)R− 1α
R
(
µ− (
1
α
−1) + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
)
1− α −
(
µ−1 + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
+1)
) . (76)
Period τ . Firm 2 receives and immediately implements a patent. In period τ , technology in
sector 1 remains as in τ − 1 , that is ψτ,1,−j = ψ < ψτ,1,j = µψ , whereas in sector 2 it becomes
ψτ,2,−j = µ
1
2 ψ < ψτ,2,j = µ
3
2 ψ . Capital in the following period is given by
kτ+1,1 =
(
(1− α)ψ
R
) 1
α
(1− l˜) (77)
kτ+1,2 =
(
(1− α)µ 12 ψ
R
) 1
α
(1− l˜) . (78)
Investment is given by
iτ =
kτ,1
µψ
+
kτ,2
µ
3
2 ψ
, (79)
which combined with (77) and (78) yields
iτ =
[
µ−1 + µ
1
2α
− 3
2
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− l˜)
R
1
α
. (80)
Output and consumption are given by
yτ =
[
1 + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α−1 (1− l˜)
R
1
α
−1
xτ = ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− l˜)R− 1α
R
(
1 + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
)
1− α −
(
µ−1 + µ
1
2α
− 3
2
) .
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Period τ + 1 . Firm 1 receives and implements a patent. Technology in the two sectors is
ψτ+1,1,−j = µψ < ψτ+1,1,j = µ2 ψ and ψτ+1,2,−j = µ
1
2 ψ < ψτ+1,2,j = µ
3
2 ψ . Then,
kτ+2,1 =
(
(1− α)µψ
R
) 1
α
(1− l˜)
kτ+2,2 =
(
(1− α)µ 12 ψ
R
) 1
α
(1− l˜) .
Investment is given by
iτ+1 =
kτ,1
µ2 ψ
+
kτ,2
µ
3
2 ψ
,
which is equal to
iτ+1 =
[
µ
1
α
−2 + µ
1
2α
− 3
2
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− l˜)
R
1
α
.
Output and consumption are given by
yτ+1 =
[
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α−1 (1− l˜)
R
1
α
−1
xτ+1 = ψ
1
α
−1 (1− α) 1α (1− l˜)R− 1α
R
(
1 + µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1
)
1− α −
(
µ
1
α
−2 + µ
1
2α
− 3
2
) .
5.1.1 Profit conditions.
As each firm can make profits for two periods out of a patent, profit condition 1 in the case of a
firm receiving a patent in period t− 1 becomes
Πt
Rt−1
+
Πt+1
Rt−1Rt
≥ Πt+1
Rt−1Rt
+
Πt+2
Rt−1RtRt+1
.
The LHS refers to discounted profits as of t− 1 made when a patent is immediately implemented,
whereas the RHS refers to discounted profits made when a patent is implemented in the following
period. The above condition does not take into account that, in the latter case, after one period a
new patent will render the one in question obsolete, which would imply that the condition would
be more easily satisfied.
Likewise, profit condition 2 becomes
Πt
Rt−1
+
Πt+1
Rt−1Rt
≥ Πt+2
Rt−1RtRt+1
+
Πt+3
Rt−1RtRt+1Rt+2
.
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Since in the steady-growth equilibrium, employment and interest rates are constant, so are
temporal profits. Then, both profit conditions boil down to R ≥ 1 .46
5.1.2 Balanced growth path
Along the balanced growth path, output, consumption and investment grow all by µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) and the
real interest rate is R = µ
1
2 (
1
α−1)
β , which implies that both profit conditions are always met. Leisure
is given by (see also fn. 23)
l˜ =
[
αµ
χ (µ − β(1− α)) + 1
]−1
. (81)
5.2 Synchronized implementation equilibrium
In the synchronized implementation equilibrium (of the type I considered in Section 3) , firm 1
postpones implementation until the following even period when it implements together with firm
2 . Let me start with the profit conditions and, subsequently, show a synchronized implementation
equilibrium is not possible when rights over a patent last two periods.
For firm 1 which receives a patent, say, in τ − 1 to prefer to implement in period τ rather than
immediately, it must be that
Πτ+1
Rτ−1Rτ
+
Πτ+2
Rτ−1Rτ Rτ+1
>
Πτ
Rτ−1
+
Πτ+1
Rτ−1Rτ
. (82)
The first term on the LHS and the second on the RHS cancel out so that (82) becomes
Πτ+2
Rτ−1Rτ Rτ+1
>
Πτ
Rτ−1
. (83)
By juxtaposing (83) with (SPC1) , we can see that postponing implementation to the following
period when the monopoly horizon is two periods is equivalent to postponing implementation to
two periods afterwards in the context of the synchronized equilibrium in the one-period monopoly
case.
Since in a stationary equilibrium interest rates and employment remain constant controlling for
the period being odd or even, it follows that Πτ = Πτ+2 . This implies that (83) becomes
47
Rτ Rτ+1 < 1 . (84)
46As in Section 3 , the no-storage condition requires that R > 1 and the TVC always holds.
47As it has been so far in the paper, whenever it comes to profit condition 2 , I ignore the possibility that new
patents can render the ones in question obsolete, which would imply that profit condition 2 is more easily met.
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Turning to profit condition 2 , this is
Πτ+1
Rτ−1Rτ
+
Πτ+2
Rτ−1Rτ Rτ+1
≥ Πτ+3
Rτ−1Rτ Rτ+1Rτ+2
+
Πτ+4
Rτ−1Rτ Rτ+1Rτ+2Rτ+3
. (85)
By stationarity, one can confirm that (85) simplifies to(
1− 1
Rτ+1Rτ+2
) (
Πτ+1 +
Πτ+2
Rτ+1
)
≥ 0.
Given that it is not possible that firms make negative profits in equilibrium since in that case they
would rather not implement their patents, this expression becomes (recall that, by stationarity,
Rτ = Rτ+2)
Rτ Rτ+1 ≥ 1 . (86)
Juxtaposing (84) and (86) implies that synchronized implementation is not possible when patent
rights last two periods.
Below I explore whether extending patent rights to two periods can lead to a welfare improve-
ment.
5.3 Welfare
I showed above that only the immediate implementation equilibrium is possible when patent rights
last two periods.48 Then the agent’s lifetime utility is
U˜i =
1
1− β
(
1
2
β
1− β logµ
1
α
−1 + log x˜i1 + χ log l˜
)
, (87)
where l˜ is given by (81) . I will compare (87) with the lifetime utility in the two equilibria which
can prevail when firms profit out of a patent once. That is I will compare (87) with (68) and (67)
in that order.
5.3.1 Welfare comparison with the synchronized implementation equilibrium
The difference in lifetime utilities is given by
Us− U˜i = 1
1− β
[
β
1 + β
(
logµ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) − log v
)
+ log xs1 − log x˜i1 + χ
(
log lodd + β log leven
1 + β
− log l˜
)]
.
(88)
48To be precise, I have failed to find an equilibrium besides this one.
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I will take the same steps as in Section 4 . Starting with the leisure terms, one can confirm that
l˜ > leven > lodd . The first inequality follows by comparing (81) with (62) , whereas the second
follows from Remark 2 . Then, although its role is non-pivotal in welfare comparisons, leisure utility
is greater in the two-period patent equilibrium.
Turning to consumption, by Claim 1 and as explained in Section 4 the growth terms together
take a negative value. However, what is once again crucial for the welfare comparison outcome is
the distance between the initial levels of consumption in the two equilibria given by (48) and (76) .
It turns out that for sufficiently low values of the innovation rate, µ , initial consumption is greater
in the two-period patent equilibrium (see also Figure 1) . I will proceed into two steps.
Starting with initial output levels, we can see from (47) and (75) for ψ = 1 that
∆y ≡ ys1 − y˜i1 =
[
µ− (
1
α
−1) + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
−1)
]
(1− α) 1α−1
(
1− lodd
R
1
α
−1
even
− 1− l˜
R
1
α
−1
)
. (89)
Taking into account that l˜ > lodd and that, by Remark 3 , Reven < R implies that the last term
is positive, hence initial output is greater in the synchronized implementation, one-period patent
equilibrium than in the two-period patent one. Furthermore, for the considered parametrization,
the initial output difference increases in µ .
Turning to initial investment levels, we can see from (44) and (74) for ψ = 1 that
∆i ≡ is1 − i˜i1 =
[
1
µ
+ µ−
1
2
( 1
α
+1)
]
(1− α) 1α
µ 12 ( 1α+1) 1− leven
R
1
α
odd
− 1− l˜
R
1
α
 . (90)
For the considered parametrization, the last term is positive and the initial (positive) investment
difference grows in µ .49
It follows from the above that, for the considered parametrization, in the synchronized imple-
mentation (one-period patent) equilibrium both output and investment are greater compared with
the two-period patent equilibrium. These follow from the fact that, in the latter, patents in sector
2 become available with one-period lag relative to the former. To inspect things more, after con-
trolling for the differences in interest rates and employment, output is the same in the considered
equilibria, whereas investment in greater in the synchronized implementation one. The former is
because firms use the same level of capital; to see this, observe that in even periods, the imple-
menting firms competitors’ technology level is the same in both equilibria. The latter is because
in odd periods no firm implements (or, appropriates) a patent in the synchronized implementation
equilibrium, as opposed to both in the two-period patent one.
49In fact, the initial investment difference is positive for all the parametrizations that I have considered.
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For the considered parametrization, at sufficiently low values of µ the “investment” effect domi-
nates the “output” effect (∆y < ∆i) , hence initial consumption is greater in the two-period patent
equilibrium. However, ∆y /∆i increases in µ and becomes greater than one for high enough values
of it. The threshold value is µ∗ ' 2.14 .
Since the level of initial consumption is pivotal in the welfare comparisons, the latter will exhibit
the same pattern: for sufficiently low values of µ , the two-period patent equilibrium is Pareto-
superior to the synchronized implementation equilibrium which can prevail when patent rights last
one period.50 The threshold value in the welfare comparison is µ∗∗ ' 1.95 (see also Figure 1) , which
is lower than µ∗ since the combination of the growth and the leisure effects favors the synchronized
implementation equilibrium.
5.3.2 Welfare comparison with the immediate implementation equilibrium
The difference in lifetime utilities is given by
Ui − U˜i = 1
1− β
[
log xi1 − log x˜i1 + χ (log l − log l˜)
]
. (91)
Starting with the leisure terms, we can confirm by comparing (40) and (81) that l˜ > l . However,
the role of leisure in the welfare comparison is negligible.
Turning to consumption, I show in the Appendix that, for all parameter values, xi1 > x˜
i
1 .
There are two forces underlying differences in consumption. On the one hand, patents may be first
implemented at the same time in the two equilibria, however, in the two-period patent equilibrium,
firms can profit out of these for one additional period. This implies that -in the two-period patent
equilibrium- patents become available to the implementing firms’ competitors and, hence, to the
economy with one period delay. One can actually confirm that, controlling for differences in em-
ployment, yt = µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) y˜t , for all t .51 On the other hand, in the two-period patent equilibrium,
two capital-good firms implement a patent in each period as opposed to one in the immediate, one-
period patent, equilibrium. As a result, and once again controlling for differences in employment,
we can see (for instance, by (27) and (74)) that it > µ
1
α
−1 i˜t , for all t . That is extending patent
rights to two-periods implies that investment falls more compared to output. Nevertheless, these
are in relative terms; in absolute terms the “output” effect always dominates the “investment” effect
and consumption falls. Furthermore, the initial consumption difference grows in µ .52
50Of course, one needs to make sure first that condition (SPC1) is met so that a synchronized implementation
equilibrium is possible.
51Taking into account differences in employment would imply that yt > µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) y˜t since 1− l > 1− l˜ .
52 This result holds for all the parametrizations that I have considered.
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With initial consumption’s role being pivotal in the welfare comparison, welfare is greater in the
one-period patent immediate implementation equilibrium.
Combining the results above leads to the central policy implication of the paper:
Proposition 2. For a sufficiently low innovation rate, extending patent rights to two periods can
lead to a welfare improvement.
5.3.3 Initial level of investment
Proceeding as in Section 4.1 , to find the initial level of investment in the two-period patent equi-
librium, I set ψ = 1 and divide the RHS of (80) by µ
1
α
−1 . This yields
i˜i0 =
[
µ−
1
α + µ−
1
2
( 1
α
+1)
]
(1− α) 1α 1− l˜
R
1
α
. (92)
For all considered parametrizations, initial investment in the two-period patent equilibrium is lower
than in both one-period patent equilibria. Hence, the welfare improvement that Proposition 2
considers is unconditional on the initial level of investment.
6 Conclusion
This paper showed that implementation cycles in the presence of capital and the absence of bor-
rowing constraints or constraints on investment volatility are possible. The reason is that patents
are on investment-specific technological change which introduces a one-period discrepancy between
the time a new patent is implemented and the time revenue out of it is realized.
Furthermore, the exogenous generation of patents permitted it to view patent rights from a dif-
ferent perspective. The “default” one concerns the incentives of innovators which, ultimately, affect
the generation of patents. This paper abstracted from this, otherwise important and heated, debate
and, instead, focused on the effects that the length of patent rights can have on the implementation
of patents. In particular, it showed that a prolongation of patent rights eliminates implementation
cycles and may lead to welfare improvements.
The model, arguably highly stylized, certainly has its limitations. From a macro-perspective,
consumption booms before output and is too volatile. From a more theoretical one, the analysis
was silent about transitional dynamics, whereas, what is a related issue, the initial conditions were
assumed to be the “right” ones. Resolving these issues could be part of future research.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Condition 1 (No storage) : There are two kinds of storable commodities in the
economy: the capital goods and the final good. I deal with these in turn. The storage technology I
assume in both cases is one-to-one.
Capital goods. Suppose that capital-good firm j produces an additional unit of capital good
i in period t − 1 and, instead of selling it to the final-good firm in period t , it instead stores and
sells it in period t + 1 (I assume that capital depreciates only if used) . The cost of producing it
as of t− 1 is, say, 1ψ , whereas the revenue generated out of it as of t− 1 is qt+1RtRt−1 , where q is the
competitive price offered by the final-good firm given by (14) . No storage takes place if
Rt
ψRtRt−1
<
1
ψ
,
which is equivalent to
Rt−1 > 1 . (93)
If, instead, the capital-good firm considers selling the additional unit of capital in period t+ 2 ,
then, ignoring the possibility that a new idea will render the one in question obsolete, the no-storage
condition becomes
RtRt−1 < 1 .
It follows then that (93) suffices to rule out storage in this case as well. Of course, if a new patent
renders the one in question obsolete and supposing that the firm in question receives the new patent
(see also the last paragraph in this proof), discounted revenue will be even lower and the no-storage
condition will hold even more easily.
Proceeding in this way, (93) suffices to rule out storage and sale of a capital good in any period
after period t+ 2 . Therefore, positive net interest rates rule out storage in equilibrium.
Let me underline that, in the above argument, I have implicitly assumed that a capital-good
firm sells at least an infinitesimally small quantity of the capital good it specializes in in t . This
implies that in case it possesses and makes use of a superior technology (patent) , that becomes
publicly available in t so that its competitors copy it and the competitive price prevails in t + 1 .
And, of course, I rule out the possibility that a firm uses two different technologies at the same
time.
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I deal with the possibility that a capital-good firm possesses a superior technology and does not
implement it in later sections of the main text and I label the respective conditions profit conditions
1 and 2 . In other words, the profit conditions and the no-storage condition act in a somewhat
complementary way. The former specify that a capital-good firm implements a patent and, since
it maximizes profits, meets the whole demand for the type of capital it specializes in when it is
conjectured to do so, whereas the latter rules out the possibility that it produces an additional
amount of capital which it stores in order to sell it in a future period.
But still there is the possibility that a firm with a superior technology prefers to implement it
in the following period, but considers using it immediately in secrecy aiming to sell the capital it
produces using it in two periods. Given that it faces a given demand from the final-good firm and
acts as a profit maximizer -that is it sells a certain profit-maximizing quantity- , for positive net
real interest rates the discounted cost of producing it tomorrow is lower than today. Given that the
price per unit is constant and common under both scenarios, once again positive net real interest
rates rule this possibility out. As for the case in which that firm considers selling capital in any
other future period (from the third period following the considered one onwards) , see my analysis
above.
Last, note that in some of the above arguments I assumed that the capital-good firm deciding
whether to store capital or not will with certainty have the chance to produce capital in the future
which, of course, need not be the case and which would render some of my above arguments
irrelevant.
Final good. It is easy to confirm that condition (93) rules out storage of the final good as
well.
Derivations in Section 3.2 :
Profit condition (58) . As stationarity requires xτ+1xτ = v, combining (53) and (56) , and
given that, again by stationarity, Rτ−1 = Rτ+1 and lτ = lτ+2 one can get
1− lτ+1
(1− α)R
1
α
−1
τ
− µ
1
α
−1(1− lτ )
R
1
α
τ−1
= v
 1− lτ
(1− α)R
1
α
−1
τ−1
− 1− lτ+1
µR
1
α
τ
 . (94)
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Rearranging terms in (94) yields(
1− lτ+1
1− lτ
)(
1
1− α +
v
µRτ
)
=
(
Rτ
Rτ−1
) 1
α
−1(µ 1α−1
Rτ−1
+
v
1− α
)
. (95)
Combining (95) with (23) implies that
1− lτ+1
1− lτ =
(
Rτ
Rτ−1
) 1
α
−1
Rτ
[
β µ (1 + β(1− α))
µ+ β(1− α)
]
. (96)
The profit condition (57) requires that
1− lτ+1
1− lτ > Rτ
(
Rτ
Rτ−1
) 1
α
−1
.
Substituting in the LHS of (57) the RHS of (96) , taking into account that Rτ and Rτ+1 are
both positive (since λ and v , given by (60) and (63) , respectively, are positive) and rearranging
yields the profit condition (58) .
Leisure equations (61) and (62) . Combining (6) with (9) and the production function (8) ,
we get
β =
yτ+1
yτ
1− lτ
1− lτ+1
lτ+1
lτ
1
Rτ
. (97)
Equations (52) and (55) together imply that
yτ+1
yτ
=
1− lτ+1
1− lτ
(
Rτ−1
Rτ
) 1
α
−1
. (98)
Substituting (98) into (97) yields
lτ+1
lτ
= β Rτ
(
Rτ
Rτ−1
) 1
α
−1
. (99)
Combining (96) and (99) results in
1− lτ+1
lτ+1
=
1− lτ
lτ
[
µ (1 + β(1− α))
µ+ β(1− α)
]
. (100)
The intratemporal optimality condition of the household in period τ is
χ
xτ
lτ
= wτ , (101)
where xτ is given by (53) .
Labor demand from the final-good firm (see (9)) is wτ =
αyτ
1−lτ , with yτ given by (52) . Combining
these and substituting on the RHS of (101) yields
41
1lτ
 1− lτ
(1− α)R
1
α
−1
τ−1
− 1− lτ+1
µR
1
α
τ
 = α
χ (1− α)
1
R
1
α
−1
τ−1
. (102)
Multiplying both sides of (102) by R
1
α
−1
τ−1 and using (99) yields
1− lτ
lτ
1
1− α −
1− lτ+1
lτ+1
β
µ
=
α
χ (1− α) . (103)
Using (100) to substitute for 1−lτ+1lτ+1 in (103) results in (62). In turn, inserting (62) into (100) yields
(61) .
Derivation of (63) . Substituting for the interest rates given by (23) into (99) and rearranging
implies
v =
(
µ(
1
α
−1)2 lτ+1
lτ
) α
2−α
. (104)
To find lτ+1lτ , divide (61) by (62) across sides which yields
lτ+1
lτ
=
α
χ
µ+β(1−α)
µ−β2(1−α)2 + 1
α
χ
µ (1+β(1−α))
µ−β2(1−α)2 + 1
. (105)
Inserting (105) into (104) results in (63) .
Proof of Claim 1 : As the fraction term in (63) is lower than one, it suffices to show that
µ(
1
α
−1)2 1−α
2−α < µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) .
It is straightforward to confirm that this is true.
Transversality Condition : The transversality condition (TVC) requires the agent’s present
discounted lifetime wealth to converge. I explore it for the synchronized implementation equilibrium.
The first step is to find the present discounted lifetime wealth of the agent. The agent’s wealth
consists of his labor income (DLI) and profits (DΠ) out of the ownership of capital-good firms. I
check both in turn.
The present discounted lifetime labor income is
DLI = w1 n1 +
w2 n2
R1
+
w3 n3
R1R2
+ . . . .
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Using the fact that, from the final-good firm’s problem, wt = α
yt
nt
and that, by stationarity,
n1 = n3 = . . . , n2 = n4 = . . . , R1 = R3 = . . . and R2 = R4 = . . . the above expression
simplifies to
DLI = n1
[
α y1
n1
+
α y3
n1R1R2
+
α y5
n1 (R1R2)2
. . .
]
+
n2
R1
[
α y2
n2
+
α y4
n2R1R2
+
α y6
n2 (R1R2)2
. . .
]
.
Since output grows by µ
1
α
−1 every two periods, the above expression boils down to
DLI = α (y1 +
y2
R1
)
1 + µ 1α−1
R1R2
+
(
µ
1
α
−1
R1R2
)2
+ . . .
 .
Turning to present discounted profits and noting that they grow by µ
1
α
−1 every two periods,
DΠ =
Π3,1 + Π3,2
R1R2
1 + µ 1α−1
R1R2
+
(
µ
1
α
−1
R1R2
)2
+ . . .
 .
Given that R1R2 =
µ
1
α−1
β2
, the above expressions converge, hence, the TVC is always satisfied.
Proceeding in the same way, it is straightforward to check that the TVC is also always satisfied
in the case of the immediate implementation equilibrium in which R = µ
1
2 (
1
α−1)
β .
Proof in Section 5.3.2 : Subtracting (76) from (31) -having set ψ = 1 in both- and taking into
account that 1− l > 1− l˜ implies that
xi1 − x˜i1 > (1− α)
1
α R−
1
α (1− l˜)
(
R
1− α
[
1 − µ− ( 1α−1)
]
−
[
µ
1
2
( 1
α
−1) − µ− 12 ( 1α+1)
])
= (1− α) 1α−1R− 1α (1− l˜)
(
R
[
1 − µ− ( 1α−1)
]
− (1− α)µ 12 ( 1α−1)
(
1 − µ− 1α
))
> (1− α) 1α−1R− 1α (1− l˜)µ 12 ( 1α−1)
[
1 − µ− ( 1α−1) − (1− α)
(
1 − µ− 1α
)]
= (1− α) 1α−1R− 1α (1− l˜)µ 12 ( 1α−1)
[
α − µ− ( 1α−1) + (1− α)µ− 1α
]
.
In the third line, I use the fact that β ∈ (0, 1) taking into account that µ > 1 and α ∈ (0, 1) ,
which imply that 1 − µ−( 1α−1) > 0 .
The next step is to show that
α − µ− ( 1α−1) + (1− α)µ− 1α ≥ 0 ,
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or equivalently that
αµ
1
α + 1− α ≥ µ . (106)
With µ > 1 and α ∈ (0, 1) , one can confirm that eq. (106) is always true. Hence, xi1 > x˜i1 , as
desired.
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Figure 1: Welfare comparison between the synchronized implementation equilibrium and the two-
period patent equilibrium
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